RONALD REBOREDO

ABRAHAM ARAD HOCHMAN (aka: Avi Arad): MOSSAD AGENT INVOLVED IN LOOTING OF LONGBAR INTERNATIONAL + GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRIMES WITH PD TRADING + OTHER BANKING SPY GAMES

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IF YOU HAVE EVIDENCE REGARDING ABRAHAM ARAD HOCHMAN (aka: Avi Arad), CONTACT US AT THE SKYPE NAMES ON TOP OF THIS PAGE.
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AVI ARAD

AVI ARAD

 

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DAVID ROSEN – UK Solicitor

David Rosen

uk.linkedin.com/pub/david-rosen/9/298/95 (FROM 2014)

 

LL.B(Hons) CFE Solicitor-Advocate, Litigator at Darlingtons. Visiting Associate Professor at Brunel University

London, United Kingdom 
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Summary

David is a well-known and highly regarded Solicitor-Advocate, appearing regularly in Magistrates Courts, County Courts, Crown Courts, the Old Bailey, and the High Court of Justice.

He is experienced in many fields of Law including, but not exhaustively, Commercial Litigation, Matrimonial Law, Party Wall Act, Easements, Defence work in Criminal and Civil Fraud, Proceeds of Crime Act, Trading Standards offences, Confidence Frauds, Boiler Room Frauds, Carousel Frauds, Identity Theft, and Commercial Sabotage.

Notable cases include representing George Best, Jimmy White, Lady Heather Mills-McCartney, and Koo Stark.

He is quietly better known in more eclectic fields of society for having represented a number of Diplomats, and was senior advisor to Dr. Avi Arad Hochman, a former Mossad Agent, in the Langbar Fraud involving £365m having disappeared from the AIM Market.

David is well-known as a Criminal Defence Lawyer to the Serious Fraud Office, and the Crown Prosecution Service

 

AVI ARAD – THE LOOTING OF LONGBAR INTERNATIONAL; LISTED ON LONDON’S ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT MARKET (AIM)

 

MARIUSZ RYBAK

 On Oct. 31, 2003, a company with no track record, employees or products listed its shares for the first time on London’s Alternative Investment Market – the city’s junior stock exchange. The company, now known as Langbar International, had a market capitalization of half a billion dollars, making it instantly one of the ten most valuable on the exchange.

On Oct. 31, 2003, a company with no track record, employees or products listed its shares for the first time on London’s Alternative Investment Market – the city’s junior stock exchange. The company, now known as Langbar International, had a market capitalization of half a billion dollars, making it instantly one of the ten most valuable on the exchange.

On the surface, the listing was a remarkable triumph for Mariusz Rybak, the former Ottawa entrepreneur who co-founded and chaired the firm. Just two years earlier, Rybak had seen most of his business interests in Canada slip into receivership or sold off. Rybak had moved to Monaco where, with the help of two Swiss bankers and a businessman with ties to Latin America, he had come up with a simple concept. His new colleagues would invest a small fortune in Langbar, which would acquire undervalued high-tech firms and sell them for a profit.

But Langbar did no such thing. Instead, it has become a symbol for a multitude of corporate sins ranging from greed and nepotism to misgovernance and alleged fraud. It was a company that generated millions of dollars in fees for its principals and professional advisers and tens of millions of dollars in profits from the sale of shares — yet never actually produced anything.

Trading in Langbar’s shares was halted in October 2005. A month later, the company acknowledged it could not verify the existence of some $800 million worth of cash assets, prompting Britain’s anti-fraud authorities to launch a criminal investigation. Although Rybak had stepped down as CEO in June 2005 — several months before the allegations of fraud broke into the open — he is now a principal target of a massive civil suit.

The legal war is being waged by Langbar’s new executive team led by David Buchler, a forensic investigator. The newcomers were installed a year ago with a mandate to solve the riddle of the missing millions and to recover as much as possible. Last March, the company sued Rybak and two of his former colleagues for $477 million for deceit and conspiracy to defraud. The company alleges that Rybak and the others formed Langbar for the express purpose of profiting from the sale of shares whose value had been inflated by fictitious assets.

On Wall Street, this sort of scheme is known more crudely as pump and dump. In recent weeks, much light has been shed by court documents on the fraud allegations. The Citizen has also interviewed dozens of people associated with the Langbar saga and with Rybak’s earlier companies in Canada. What emerges is a portrait of a bright, often solitary and aloof entrepreneur who appears to have cut corners in a relentless drive to become rich.

Whether that made him capable of pulling off a large-scale fraud, as Langbar now asserts, or merely created the circumstance in which he himself could be duped, as Rybak maintains, is still unclear.

What is absolutely certain is that Rybak profited immensely, having sold an estimated $70 million worth of shares before the firm stopped trading.

Rybak says he conducted all his business affairs in good faith and had no reason to conclude that Langbar’s major assets were faked. Nevertheless, a close examination of Langbar’s short history as a public company suggests that if Rybak wasn’t persuaded his company’s financial assets were questionable, he certainly should have had suspicions. Because the red flags were flying high from the beginning.

Warren Cabral, the managing partner of Langbar’s Bermuda-based law firm Appleby Spurling and Kempe, was one of the first to recognize something was amiss, according to an affidavit filed earlier this year by Langbar in London’s High Court. Several weeks after Langbar’s shares had been trading on London’s AiM exchange, Cabral was shocked to discover that none of Langbar’s principals had actually paid for their initial allotment of stock. When Cabral heard the company’s explanation — the cheque in one case had been lost while four others never arrived because of “bank error” — he exploded.

“We are incredulous that five payments for share subscriptions should bounce at the same time,” he wrote in a Dec. 30 e-mail to his co-counsel in London. “Various scenarios of increasing severity present themselves: acquiring the shares by some sort of deception being the worse, with a knock-on of the listing on AiM and subsequent increase in value of the shares introducing proceeds of crime issues.”

Although the payments for the initial shares were finally deposited with Langbar’s bank on Dec. 23, Cabral set out his concerns to Rybak in a separate e-mail. In it, he demanded a full explanation for what he termed Langbar’s “casual” business conduct, according to the affidavit. Rybak maintains in a statement of defence (filed last summer but only recently released after the Citizen petitioned the judge in the case) that he paid for his shares by cheque shortly before Langbar began trading on Oct. 31. He felt he had thereby discharged his obligation.

Rybak terminated Langbar’s relationship with Appleby Spurling by letter on Jan. 25.

Another troubling development involved the resignation on Nov. 18 of the firm’s first CEO, Wolfgang Menzel – less than three weeks after Langbar’s shares began trading. The press release noted that Menzel had stepped down due to health reasons. But that was a lie. Menzel told the Citizen during an interview in late 2005 that he had quit over differences with Rybak without being specific. Rybak agreed that health issues had nothing to do with it, but declined to say for the record what did. The company cancelled the 7.6 million shares it had awarded Menzel for his role as co-founder.

Menzel, 57, a smooth, multi-lingual banker and financial consultant, met Rybak socially in 2002 and later introduced him to the people who would become principals in Langbar. The two most important were: Jean-Pierre Regli, 50, a trim, bald man who offers wealth management services to clients from his home base in Lugano, Switzerland; and Abraham Arad, a brash, substantially overweight native of Argentina with homes in Barcelona and Jerusalem. Regli would become Langbar’s chief financial officer while Arad would contribute the lion’s share of the initial investment in Langbar through the fund he managed, Lambert Financial Investments Ltd.

Arad and Menzel had a shared history. They have been colleagues for many years and both served as directors in the mid-1990s of B.C.-based Diversified Investment Strategies Inc., which sold products for cleaning up oil spills and traded on what is now the TSX Venture exchange. Based on Citizen interviews over the past year, they did not appear intimately familiar with Rybak’s history in Canada.

It’s a 10-minute stroll downhill from Rybak’s luxury tower to Monaco’s famous casino. This time of year, the country’s beaches are nearly empty. Even the pristine boardwalk that snakes along the Mediterranean is unusually free of Monegasques and their pampered pets. However, the square near the Palace is a magnet for gamblers and shoppers, many of them ferried there in an astonishing variety of high-end autos. Monaco is a sweet haven for people with substantial assets. The tiny, two-square-kilometre country levies no taxes on income, wealth or capital gains. Even better, it offers safe streets and a location tucked between France and Italy, in the foothills of the Alps along the Mediterranean. There is a list of hurdles you must overcome to qualify as a resident, but the big ones are these: you must establish you have a residence and you must show the authorities you have a bank balance of at least $500,000 — though some banks will accept less on a case by case basis.

In some ways it was an odd spot for Rybak to set down roots. He and his wife Izabela, his high school sweetheart from their native Poland, didn’t know anyone in Monaco. Rybak’s Canadian business empire — centred on a chemical detection firm called Intelligent Detection Systems –had slipped into receivership in April 2001. Its assets were sold the following month.

Nevertheless, Rybak had spent nearly two decades in Ottawa and Toronto and considered the country home. Later, he would keep returning to the idea of re-purchasing some of the assets once owned by IDS. Andy, his older brother and a key executive at IDS, had retired in Ottawa. They still chat now and then, but not about Langbar. “I had nothing to do with that,” Andy says.

Mariusz said he had initially picked Switzerland as the ideal haven because that was where his only daughter Magdalena worked. But residency requirements there proved difficult. So he chose Monaco as the next best thing.

One obvious question, in light of the crash of his Canadian operations, concerns where Rybak obtained the resources to establish himself in such an expensive enclave. He and Izabela live in a neighbourhood where units sell for millions of dollars. An analysis of his finances suggests he might have earned enough cash through the exercise of some $1.2 million worth of stock options as well as the sale of Canadian real estate. In 2001, he sold his 6,000-square-foot penthouse condominium on Toronto’s waterfront to NBA basketball star Vince Carter for an estimated $2.75 million — enough to afford Rybak an entry-level lifestyle in Monaco, but not much more.

People noticed the differences in the brothers right away. Andy, a former bureaucrat from Poland’s foreign service, was a less intense and friendlier version of his younger brother. Mariusz was an academic with degrees in environmental science; he was the one with drive. In the mid-1980s, Mariusz established a pair of family-owned companies that provided environmental assessments and other services in Ottawa. These were small, break-even operations and Mariusz hungered for bigger things. In 1995, he purchased an explosives detection technology from Ottawa entrepreneur Colin Corrigan and transformed it into the flagship product for IDS.

When the company sold some units to the U.S. Federal Aviation Authority, Mariusz pounced on the opportunity. He took IDS public late in 1997 on the Toronto Stock Exchange, raising $14 million in the process. A few months later, he hired Vic Alboini, an executive with Yorkton Securities. (Alboini, now a principal with Toronto-based Northern Securities Inc., would later try to help Rybak analyze takeover targets for Langbar). Yorkton helped Rybak raise another $19.4 million by selling more IDS shares and warrants in a secondary issue. Rybak then launched a successful hostile takeover of Scintrex, a scientific instruments firm based just north of Toronto.

At this point, two things were evident to those who dealt with Rybak. First, he could be cold. Scintrex CEO Abe Rolnick recalls that Rybak never called him personally, even to make the original offer to buy his firm. And when the deal was done, Rybak instructed Scintrex’s top human resources official to fire Rolnick, who had been a key figure at Scintrex for many years. It was a pattern others in Ottawa had seen before. Scott Feagan, who in the late 1990s ran a business unit under Rybak’s control was summarily fired early 1998 over differences in business strategy.

Rybak showed up one day with a personnel employee and told Feagan to clear out.

Rybak viewed business as a complex chess game. During the heyday of IDS — which at its peak was worth more than $200 million and employed 225 — his dream was a billion-dollar-a-year conglomerate with many interlocking parts and technologies. When he needed particular skills to make certain moves, Mariusz could be charming and witty. But former colleagues also noted his tendency to let relationships go when the need for a service had been met.

The second point about Rybak is that he liked to live large at home and at work. After IDS completed its takeover of Scintrex — a modest, $20 million-a-year operation — Rybak shifted the headquarters of his company from Ottawa to the top floor of the Bank of Montreal tower in Toronto’s financial district. He wanted to be surrounded by Canada’s biggest firms and to be closer to the financial markets, he said at the time. And no wonder. For the next two years, Rybak was in overdrive, splitting up IDS and Scintrex into eight different business units, with plans to take some of them public as well.

But there was a problem with IDS accounting. And it would cost Rybak his job.

Early in 2000, Al Leslie, the Ottawa-based accountant for KPMG, the original accountants for Rybak’s firm felt IDS had pushed the envelope too far in accounting terms. There were two issues in particular that triggered his concern, according to documents later filed by IDS. The first was that IDS in KPMG’s view had improperly recognized a gain on the sale of some inventory to a related party (LTG Lasertech Group) and recorded it as revenue, thus artificially boosting the company’s total sales figures.

A second set of auditors consulted later by IDS agreed with KPMG. The second issue (involving IDS subsidiary Chemicorp) was more complicated, but it too involved a gain that should not have been recorded as such.

Leslie voiced his concerns during several meetings with Ray Hession, the chairman of IDS’ audit committee. Following their discussions, KPMG delivered a formal note to IDS’ audit committee, noting that it no longer wished to serve as the company’s auditor.

Hession said he had a discussion with Rybak, following which the company’s board of directors forced Rybak to step down as CEO in May 2000. Roland Horst, the Toronto businessman who had been hired by Rybak just a few weeks earlier to run the Scintrex division of IDS said he was surprised to learn of Rybak’s exit, not least because Rybak on May 1 had signed a note to shareholders in which he talked about IDS’s coming year in glowing terms.

Rybak says his conversation with Hession was not a determining factor in his decision to exit as CEO. He asserts that since he did not have an accounting background, he relied on professional advice adding that IDS’s accountants and auditors could be only as aggressive as generally accepted accounting practices allowed.

Still, it’s clear the accounting issues at IDS were serious. But, in terms of scale, they were dwarfed by the ones that would later rock Rybak’s new company.

The key to unravelling the Langbar story likely rests somewhere inside its major investor, Lambert Financial Investments — not least because this entity was the apparent source of the two major financial instruments at the heart of the fraud allegations. Lambert is a private fund of uncertain size and pedigree. According to Arad, its managing director, Lambert controls the financial assets of close to 2,000 Jewish families, many of them based in Latin America. Rybak says he and his Bermuda lawyers were permitted to examine the list of investors but remain obliged not to reveal their names.

There is some question about how much influence, if any, that Rybak exerted over Lambert.

Langbar’s affidavit cites e-mails sent by Rybak to the company’s broker Insinger Townsley in mid-2004 that appear to suggest he had signing authority over Lambert’s account. William Watson III, the Florida-based lawyer who is representing Arad told the Citizen that Rybak’s authority was conferred by a proxy. Rybak denied these allegations. What is known is that Lambert did some of its banking at Geneva-based Banque SCS Alliance and that Arad was willing, indeed eager to invest substantially in Langbar. According to Rybak, such promises were made as early as May 2003.

It’s easy to see why Rybak was excited by the prospect. Originally, he had been thinking of raising $25 million to $30 million for Langbar’s initial capitalization. Now here was a potential investor willing to contribute more than $200 million. Rybak, in his statement of defence, said this was because Arad had “complete confidence in Rybak and Rybak’s business model.”

In late October, just days before Langbar began trading, Lambert committed itself to buying 59 per cent of Langbar’s initial equity (in the form of common shares) for 207 million euros. Rybak points out in his statement of defence that AVF, a German bank, purchased equity in Langbar for a similar per share price. But that was for less than four per cent of the company’s capital. Lambert’s investment was not only hugely bigger, it was a remarkable display of faith in a Canadian entrepreneur who Arad had just met.

At least until it came to the question of making good the money pledge. Lambert did not pay for its 41 million shares until mid-December 2003 — when it sent Langbar a certificate of deposit for $275 million U.S. from Lambert’s account at the Banco do Brasil. In his statement of claim, Rybak maintains that a banking error had resulted in a delay of the issuance of shares and he did not view Lambert’s decision not to pay as unreasonable. Nevertheless, when the payment finally arrived in December, there were more warning signs.

A routine check by SCS — which had accepted the deposit — discovered that one of the signatories on the certificate of deposit had quit Banco do Brasil prior to Dec. 13, the date of the certificate. Concerned at this finding, SCS hired Proximal Consulting, a business crime investigative agency with offices in Britain and Switzerland, to do some further digging. Proximal’s checks with Banco do Brasil’s London office determined that the international certificate of deposit — as Langbar called it — is not genuine and is therefore completely worthless.” A further check with Britain’s Metropolitan Police turned up another nugget: the phrase, international certificate of deposit, is a meaningless term used by fraud artists.

According to the Langbar affidavit, SCS asserts that it provided copies of Proximal’s conclusions to Regli and Rybak in separate meetings. However, Regli says he never saw a copy and Rybak noted in his statement of defence that he was never made aware of Proximal’s suspicions. Rybak’s e-mails, which were made available to Langbar earlier this year, might have shed some light on the transactions during this period. Unfortunately they cover only the period from April 2004. Rybak told Langbar his earlier e-mails were damaged by a computer virus, according to the affidavit.

Langbar’s exposure to potential fraud deepened in the spring of 2004.

The details are complicated, involving the award of $700 million U.S. worth of construction contracts in Argentina. But the upshot is simple. Arad and Lambert agreed to pay Langbar $350 million for the right to take over the Argentine projects — a sum that Langbar booked as profit.

By any objective consideration, this was an extremely generous payment. Assuming Lambert was not prepared to accept a loss in completing the project, this implied the original contracts had built-in profit margins in excess of 50 per cent — an exceptionally high amount for any industry, let alone the intensely competitive building trades sector where margins of less than 20 per cent are more common. Lambert made good its acquisition of the contracts with a promissory note due May 2005.

Forensic investigators hired by Langbar would later conclude that this asset, too, was faked.

While CEO, Rybak continually attempted to covert his Lambert assets into a form he could actually use. The Lambert certificates were pieces of paper — promises to pay cash a year later. The only way to turn them into liquid currency immediately was to convince a company or financial institution to accept what Lambert had to offer as collateral. It was very telling that, outside of Russia, none did, at least on terms that Langbar found acceptable. When Rybak did locate Russian investors willing to do a deal on the basis of the Lambert paper, Rybak said he halted the transaction when he discovered too many middlemen wanted a piece of the action.

Rybak’s efforts to acquire a first investment for Langbar were prodigious. With Arad’s contacts serving as scouts, Rybak looked at several potential properties in Russia — a hydrocarbon trading company, several oil firms and pharmaceutical companies. Rybak did not shrink from attempting some very large deals. In 2004, he looked into buying SIA International, a Russian pharmaceutical firm. The price was $475 million U.S. with a requirement that $200 million U.S. be paid in cash. Rybak canvassed half a dozen investment banks and international equity funds and discovered that Amaranth, a U.S.-based hedge fund, was willing to lend it $200 million using Lambert’s 2003 certificate of deposit as collateral.

However, Amaranth’s legal advisers sent Langbar’s lawyers an e-mail in November, noting that Banco do Brasil does not issue certificates of deposit denominated in U.S. currency from branches in Brazil. Two days later, according to the Langbar affidavit, Rybak e-mailed Amaranth, asking it to suspend work on the deal. Rybak in his statement of defence said he had been negotiating with other potential lenders and considered Amaranth’s terms to be “expensive and unattractive.” He also said the e-mail from Amaranth’s advisers did not cause him to cast doubt on the Lambert certificate of deposit nor, he added, did any of Langbar’s advisers call it into question.

Langbar presented a strange spectacle to the outside world. Its headquarters was in Bermuda, its shares were trading in London and Frankfurt, and its principals were scattered from Monaco to Israel. After Langbar sold its Argentine building contracts to Lambert, it had no active business and still no employees.

What little actual cash Langbar had on hand, Rybak was ripping through at a very rapid clip. Langbar’s investigators reckon Rybak spent more than $4 million on lawyers, accountants, financial advisors and other outside professionals. He also spent heavily on private jets — an estimated $900,000 — to ferry company principals and professionals alike. And not least, the principals and several family members also received $1.3 million in fees and miscellaneous payments.

No one appeared to get more out of Langbar than Rybak. Under the terms of the company’s founding, Rybak not only controlled 60 per cent of the firm’s voting shares, he also was to be paid a monthly management fee through CMC, his personal consulting firm. The monthly fee was set at 0.75 per cent of Langbar’s net assets. The latter, of course, were significant, at least on paper.

During an interview with the Citizen a year ago in Monaco, Rybak said he eventually tired of trying to make acquisitions that foundered on the quality of Langbar’s assets. That’s why he informed the other Langbar principals in the spring of 2005 that he wanted to quit as CEO and sever all ties with the firm.

When he formally stepped down as the firm’s top executive in June 2005, the company owed him a terrific amount of money, courtesy of CMC and his consulting fees. Since Langbar couldn’t pay with cash, Rybak settled by accepting common shares in Langbar — the company estimates he wound up with more than 76 million shares. Rybak declined to confirm that number, but agreed the figure was significant. After he left, Rybak began a program of what he termed an “orderly unwinding” of his position in the company. Langbar estimates that Rybak sold still owned 34.1 million shares when trading was halted in October — implying he sold more than half his Langbar stake for a profit of $70 million. Nor was he the only one. Arad and Lambert, which owned 61 million shares at one point, sold at least 12 million, according to Langbar, pocketing significant profits.

When Stuart Pearson took over from Rybak as CEO, he said he wanted to shift the company’s focus toward investing in smaller companies. But, as a chartered accountant with more than three decades’ of experience, Pearson knew the importance of trying to move Langbar’s assets from Brazil to a country where he could access them. Which is why, unlike Rybak, Pearson flew to Brazil in July 2005 to meet with representatives of Banco do Brasil.

Unfortunately for him, there followed a tragicomedy of misrepresentation. Pearson was met in Sao Paulo by Arad who, in turn, introduced Pearson to an official in the lobby of the main Banco do Brasil office building. The official did not speak English so Arad served as translator. Pearson was told the meeting had to take place in the foyer because there had been a bomb scare in the main offices earlier that morning. The next day, in a separate office building, Pearson was handed a letter from someone purporting to be a Banco do Brasil representative. The letter confirmed that the bank was holding two certificates of deposit on behalf of Langbar and a subsidiary.

It was only later that Pearson would learn that the details for these instruments differed from those included in Langbar’s audited accounts. For example, the letters he received in Sao Paulo showed that the certificates of deposit carried an interest rate of 7.5 per cent — not 7.25 per cent as the official Langbar accounts showed for one of the instruments.

Meantime, Pearson proclaimed in a press release that Langbar’s Banco do Brasil assets, representing $660 million U.S. ($800 million Cdn.) were real and had been confirmed. He also followed up on the suggestion by the Banco do Brasil official to move one of the certificates of cash to ABN AMRO in the Netherlands — with which Banco do Brasil had reciprocal banking arrangements. On Aug. 31, according to the affidavit, Pearson received an e-mail from Arad telling him Banco do Brasil had agreed to transfer the certificate.

Pearson’s world was about to come apart. It happened after he asked Langbar’s brokers to verify that the certificate from the Brazilian bank had entered the European clearing system.

On Oct. 11, 2005, a security official with ABN AMRO — the Dutch bank that was to have accepted the Banco do Brasil deposit — said his bank did not actually have a Langbar account. Nor did ABN AMRO issue paper certificates of deposit. Shocked by this news, Pearson called a board meeting the following day. The directors agreed Pearson should ask the AiM exchange to suspend trading in Langbar shares.

On Oct. 13, Langbar hired Kroll Associates UK Ltd. to investigate the company’s assets. A week later, Paul Spencer Lloyd, the financial crime officer for ABN AMRO in London sent Kroll an e-mail saying the Banco do Brasil certificate was “a fantasy document.” More recently, Langbar hired Jones Day LLP to conduct a wide-ranging probe of the company’s finances and attempt to recover assets on behalf of shareholders. Jones Day discovered that the numbering on the certificates of deposit did not conform to common international standards.

On Nov. 4, there followed more bad news. Paul Sawyer, head of compliance for Banco do Brasil in London informed Kroll that Langbar’s other main asset — the certificate related to Lambert’s original purchase of shares — was also dodgy. “The transactions these certificates allegedly represent do not currently exist and have at no time existed in the books of Banco do Brasil,” Sawyer wrote. Britain’s anti-fraud authorities announced Nov. 29 they had begun their criminal probe for fraud.

When David Buchler took over as executive chairman of Langbar last Dec. 19, it was the signal that 2006 would be a difficult year for Rybak, Arad and Regli. Buchler’s history included the chairmanship of DB Consultants and a role as co-founder of Buchler Phillips, which specializes in recovering assets lost to theft or fraud.

It was Buchler’s decision to hire Jones Day, the firm now leading the recovery effort in behalf of Langbar. The launch of the $477-million civil suit in March was just the beginning.

Rybak, Arad and Regli are subject to a rare international freezing order, issued earlier this year by a British judge. Rybak, for instance, has had $70 million of his assets frozen, while Arad and Regli have seen smaller amounts tied up. However, Arad and Regli have failed to comply with the conditions of the order that, among other things, requires them to reveal the location of personal assets. Regli, who says he doesn’t have the money to defend himself in a British legal action, was sentenced in absentia earlier this year to six months in prison for contempt of court. Arad earlier this month received a 12-month sentence. His lawyer, Watson, said Arad is not only in ill health — he has a heart condition — but also couldn’t afford to contest the contempt-of-court proceedings in London. Rybak has complied with the conditions set out by the freezing order and is conducting a wide-ranging defence of his assets, and maintains his innocence.

Rybak’s position is a difficult one. His 98-page defence filing translates into the notion that he trusted his well-paid professional advisers to alert him to any possible fraud. In the absence of such warnings, Rybak said he proceeded on the assumption that Langbar’s considerable paper assets were real.

Set against this is Langbar’s case that Rybak controlled 60 per cent of the company’s voting shares and appeared to benefit most from running a company that produced nothing. Langbar asserts that at the very least Rybak was “reckless” as to the existence of a fraud.

Master manipulator or dupe? Either way, this story is not likely to have a happy ending for him.

 

AVI ARAD – OCG MEMBER WITH ALEJANDRO LAVALLE, NAGY SHEHATA, RONALD REBOREDO, ANDRES TOUCEDO, RICARDO LOPEZ FERNANDEZ
 

MUGSHOT (ABOVE LEFT) – ANDRES TOUCEDO

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SCOTT RICKARD: CIA + MOSSAD BANKING, MONEY LAUNDERING + INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME JOINT VENTURE

As previously reported, many of the suspects that murdered Mahmoud al-Mabhouh in Dubai earlier this year used MasterCards branded by US banking institution MetaBank of Storm Lake, Iowa and issued by US prepaid debit card company Payoneer Inc.  The suspects used the credit cards to buy plane tickets and other items related to the assassination operation in Dubai.

 

It was also previously reported that Payoneer’s CEO, Yuval Tal, is a former member of the IDF Special Forces.

 

What is now known is that Payoneer is actually a joint venture between US CIA and Israeli Mossad intelligence.  Payoneer, based in New York with R&D offices and a majority of its employees in Tel-Aviv, is funded by Israeli intelligence venture capital companies that operate out of Herzliya, Israel, headquarters for Israeli Mossad intelligence operations.

 

This can be substantiated by following the money.  Interpol, the FBI and Dubai police have gone silent with regard to the credit card transactions and financial details of the suspects and the financial institutions that enabled the suspects.

 

Very simply, Payoneer is funded and held by three venture capital firms: Greylock Partners, Carmel Ventures, and Crossbar Capital.

 

Greylock has offices in the US and Herzliya, Israel, with the office in Herzliya run by Moshe Mor, a former military intelligence captain in the Israeli army.

 

Greylock has been investing in US government ventures for over 4 decades and has very close ties with the CIA, Mossad and Department of Defense.

 

For example, Howard Cox joined Greylock in 1971 after two years in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis). Howard is a former Chairman of the National Venture Capital Association.  Howard also serves on the Secretary of Defense Business Board and the board of In-Q-Tel, the CIA venture capital arm.

 

http://www.greylock.com/teams/28-Howard-Cox

 

https://www.iqt.org/about-iqt/#panel2

 

Carmel Ventures is a top-tier Israeli venture capital fund also based in Herzliya, Israel with $600 million under management. Carmel Ventures was co-founded by Avi Zeevi, a veteran high-tech executive, and co-founder of the Viola Group, a leading innovative private equity investment group with close to $2 Billion under management.

 

http://www.carmelventures.com/people/investment-team/3-avi-zeevi.html

 

Avi is a leading figure in the Israeli VC community and is a member of the Executive Committee of the Israel Venture Association. Avi also served as an active Chairman of Actimize Ltd. from 2001 and until it was sold to NICE Systems Ltd. (NASDAQ: NICE) in July 2007 for $280 million on the verge of its IPO. NICE Systems, run by former Israeli Mossad intelligence officers, provides communications recording equipment to US law enforcement and emergency services (e 911), and can conveniently use those systems for surveillance and intelligence gathering services.

 

Crossbar Partners is run by Charlie Federman, who is also managing director of the BRM Group, a venture capital fund also in Herzliya, Israel that was co-founded by Nir Barkat, the mayor of Jerusalem.

 

Payoneer’s hosted service provider in Israel also hosts a number of Israeli military and intelligence systems.

 

http://www.013netvision.net.il/Article/?ArticleID=658723&pid=50&wnc=1

 

Other credit cards used by the suspects show ties to Britain’s Nationwide Building Society (closely tied to the infamous Clifford Chance law firm http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/Clifford-Chance-LLP-Company-History.html), IDT Finance of Gilbraltar (created by  Howard S. Jonas’ IDT Corp out of Newark, New Jersey http://www.idt.net/about/management.aspx), and Germany’s DZ Bank AG (which has over a century of influence on the Israeli Palestinian Conflict http://www.amazon.com/Labor-Origins-Israeli-Palestinian-Conflict-1882-1914/dp/0520204018).

 

The Metabank, Storm Lake, Iowa banking institution that branded the suspects MasterCards, also owns and operates MetaBank.ch, an online Swiss bank database built specifically to provide “discreet” access to private, retail and investment banks domiciled in Switzerland. The organization was put together to help “investors” find a “safe haven”.  The CIA and Mossad use this safe haven to discreetly move money internationally for their operations.

 

Metabank provides secret access to independent entities capable of protecting and hiding money from modern quasi-governmental economy and blind-sighted regulators.

 

As you know, Swiss banks are today’s gold standard of reliability and assets protection, and this site lists their profiles, contacts and statistical summaries.

 

Metabank is associated with:

 

The Federal Authorities of the Swiss Confederation

Swiss Federal Banking Commission (SFBC)

Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR)

Association of Swiss Commercial and Investment Banks (ASCIB)

International Capital Market Association (ICMA)

Swiss Financial Analysts Association (SFAA)

Swiss Association of Asset Managers (SAAM)

Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA)

Swiss Foreign Bankers’ Association (AFBS)

Swiss Interbank Clearing (SIC)

EURO Interbank Clearing (EuroSIC)

Swiss Bankers Association (SBA)

Swiss Private Bankers Association (SPBA)

Swiss Society of Investment Professionals (SPPS)

Swiss Exchange (SWX)

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD)

Swiss Funds Association (SFA)

Federal Department of Finance (FDF)

 

http://www.metabank.ch/investment-banks

 

Please contact me anytime if you would like more information. I know the people that built the systems for Metabank.ch. I can also give you some great information on Metabank’s executive leadership.

 

PB TRADING SOPHISTICATED FRAUD + MONEY LAUNDERING KINGPIN SENDS OUT DAUGHTER TO DO INTIMIDATION FOR HIM

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Florencia REBOREDO -- 01 Florencia REBOREDO -- 02

[17-4-2015 22:24:44] Florencia Reboredo: you have in a web site – thewhistleblowers- information regarding my father. As you may know is illegal share photos and passport without any authorization. If you do not take the pictures related Ronald Reboredo I will start legal action for defamation.

 

BELOW, SEE RONALD REBOREDO ALONG WITH OTHER NAMED LEADERS OF THE PB TRADING OCG
USING COUNTERFEIT BANK DOCUMENTS TO COMMIT MAJOR FRAUD + SOPHISTICATED MONEY 
LAUNDERING

PB TRADING PART 1.---01 PB TRADING PART 1.---02 PB TRADING PART 1.---03 PB TRADING PART 1.---04 PB TRADING PART 1.---05 PB TRADING PART 1.---06 PB TRADING PART 1.---07 PB TRADING PART 2.----01 PB TRADING PART 2.----02 PB TRADING PART 2.----03 PB TRADING PART 2.----04 PB TRADING PART 2.----05 PB TRADING PART 2.----06 PB TRADING PART 2.----07 PB TRADING PART 2.----08

HERE ARE 2 OF THE SOPHISTICATED, ORGANIZED, INTERNATIONAL FRAUDSTERS + MONEY LAUNDERERS OPERATING FROM BRAZIL THE SAFARO SHELL COMPANY PLATFORM

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IF YOU HAVE EVIDENCE REGARDING SOPHISTIACTED FRAUD or MONEY LAUNDERING ACTIVITIES BY RUY SILVA or SILVANA NEVES, CONTACT US AT THE SKYPE NAMES ON TOP OF THIS PAGE.

….

IMG_5740

Ruy Manuel Rufino Caleiro de Oliveira e Silva + Silvana Neves

IMG_5741

RUY MANUEL RUFINO CALEIRO DE OLIVEIRA E SILVA Profissão: empresário Estado Civil: divorciado, Natural de Nampula, Moçambique – África, Nascido aos 07/01/1957, Residente em São Paulo Filiação: RUY DE OLIVEIRA E SILVA MARIA ELSA MADEIRA RUFINO OLIVEIRA E SILVA.- SILVANA NEVES Profissão: administradora de empresas Estado Civil: solteira, Natural de São Paulo, SP, Nascido aos 29/07/1965, Residente em São Paulo Filiação: SEBASTIÃO FERNANDES NEVES ERMIDES NEVES.

THE FAKE PICTURES USED ON THEIR SAFARO WEBSITE
http://safarocorporation.com/

SAFARO 1 SAFARO 2

 

THEIR UK SHELL COMPANY PLATFORM

UBN TRADEFIN LIMITED
UBN INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION LIMITED
SAFARO INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION LIMITED
SAFARO MINING & METALS LIMITED
IBU AVIATION CAPITAL LIMITED
UBN MINING & METALS LIMITED
BRASBANCO INVESTMENT (UK) LIMITED
SAFARO PROPERTY CORPORATION LIMITED
MOSSURIL SECURITIES LIMITED
SAFARO TRADEFIN LIMITED
SAFARO FINANCE LIMITED
ELWARY CAPITAL SECURITIES LIMITED
MILLIWAVE UK LIMITED
HILLINGDON YOUTH NETWORK LIMITED
UK MILLIWAVE LTD
UBN SECURITIES LIMITED
VIECO-SERFIDE-INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT BANCORP LIMITED
RSR X INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION LIMITED
SAFARO TRADEFIN LIMITED
MANGO TECHNOLOGIES AND COMMUNICATIONS LIMITED
VIECO-SERFIDE VENTURE CAPITAL LIMITED
1 OF THEIR SENIOR ASSOCIATES (RICARDO LOPEZ FERNANDEZ)


RICARDO LOPEZ FERNANDEZ, AVI ARAD, RONALD REBOREDO + ALEJANDRO LAVALLE ALSO INVOLVED IN SOPHISTICATED, ORGANIZED, INTERNATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING AT PB TRADING
AVI ARAD Passport Ronald J. Reboredo Suarez --XL
AVI ARAD

PB TRADING PART 1.---01 PB TRADING PART 1.---02 PB TRADING PART 1.---03 PB TRADING PART 1.---04 PB TRADING PART 1.---05 PB TRADING PART 1.---06 PB TRADING PART 1.---07 PB TRADING PART 2.----01 PB TRADING PART 2.----02 PB TRADING PART 2.----03 PB TRADING PART 2.----04 PB TRADING PART 2.----05 PB TRADING PART 2.----06 PB TRADING PART 2.----07 PB TRADING PART 2.----08

RAYMOND CARRASCO 2007 EXPLAINED THE CREATION OF PB TRADING, ITS MEMBERS, ITS FRAUD + ITS MONEY LAUNDERING

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PB TRADING PART 2---01 PB TRADING PART 2---02 PB TRADING PART 2---03 PB TRADING PART 2---04 PB TRADING PART 2---05 PB TRADING PART 2---06 PB TRADING PART 2---07 PB TRADING PART 2---08